Reluctant Judicial Factfinding:
When Minimalism and Judicial Modesty Go Too Far
Scott A. Moss
t
I. THE MINIMALISM DEBATE, AND A
COMPETING ARGUMENT FOR AN INCREASED JUDICIAL ROLE
A. Minimalism's Ideologically Diverse Fan Club
Judicial minimalism is all the rage among a wide range of judges
and commentators. T he basic idea is not new: that the Supreme Court
should exercise restraint in striking down laws based on constitutional
rights is a traditional argument of judicial conservatives, originalists, and
others with qualms about broad constitutional decisions.' I n this vein,
Douglas Kmiec praises one o f the Roberts Court's first high-profile
cases, Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England,
"profound[]
2 a s
aexercise of judicial restraint."
lenge
3 I nto a requirement
r e j e c tofi parental
n g consent for a minor's abortion, "Ayotte
stands
for
three
principles:
a
f a c i nullify
a l no more of an unconstitutional law
than
do
c ishnecessary,
a
l not- rewrite state laws to make them constitutional,
and stay true to the intent of the legislature in passing the law at issue."
4
t Associate Professor, University of Colorado Law School.
1. For examples of judges espousing this view, see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]his most illiberal Court h a s embarked on a course o f
inscribing one after another of the current preferences of the society (and in some cases only the
counter-majoritarian preferences of the society's law-trained elite) into our Basic Law."); Diane S.
Sykes, Reflections on the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 89 MARC?. L. REV. 723, 737- 38 (2006)
(Seventh Circuit judge and former state Supreme Court Justice criticizing several rulings broadening
constitutional rights because courts should "defer to the judgment of those elected to represent the
people" and because "legislative correction is impossible and the constitution is difficult to amend").
2. 546 U.S. 320, 323 (2006) (holding that if a state statute requiring parental notification before
a minor has an abortion "would be unconstitutional in medical emergencies i n v a l i d a t i n g the
statute entirely is not always necessary or justified, for lower courts may be able to render narrower
declaratory and injunctive relief").
3. Douglas W. Kmiec, Overview of the Term: The Rule of Law & Roberts's Revolution of
Restraint, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 495, 515 (2007).
4. Id
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What is new is minimalism's support from those who support
decisions broadening constitutional rights. C as s Sunstein famously
agrees with Roe v. Wade
but
5 topines
h a t that:
t h e
C oMlle
n Court
s t i would
t u thave done fa r better to proceed slowly and
i o incrementally
n
[ I t ] might have ruled that abortions could not be
p prohibited
r o tin cases
e
o f rape or incest, or that the law at issue in Roe
was
invalid
even
if
some abortion restrictions might be acceptable.
c t s
Such
narrow
grounds
would have allowed democratic processes to
a
b
o
r
proceed with a degree o f independence—and perhaps to find their
t own
i creative
o
nsolutions .
r 6 i
g
Sunstein
similarly
splits the difference on other controversial rights,
h
t
s
defending how the Court simultaneously refused to strike a ban on
assisted suicide' y et struck a criminal ban on nontraditional sex.
Sunstein said that in the latter case, however, he "would have preferred a
narrower rationale for the Courts conclusion": "For substantive due
process, a form of minimalism seems best, embodied in a willingness
to reject some traditions, but in a way that is usually respectful of democratic judgments and that attempts to avoid the most contentious debates
Minimalism has its limitaot.ns and critics, of course. Sunsteir
self notes that minimalism is not the panacea for alljurisprudence: "Any
defense of minimalist adjudication is essentially the same in principle as
a defense of standards over rules—and there is no reason to think that
such a defense can be made convincing in nfl of the contexts
- w adjudicates:
Court
&ism— its declaration of a
one
manifestation
of the Court's
6 I major
n
a
breadth in remedies—
preference
m o r feor "proportionality"
o f defendant wrongdoers above justice to
c"elevates
r i tthe
i preferences
c
plaintiffs.
This
perversion
of
the remedial poess into protection for the
a l
wrongdoer
is
a
threat
to
the
rule
of law
v
e
i
n
.
T
r
a
c
U.S. 113 (1973).
y 5.410
6, CAss R- SUNSTEIN, LEGAL P
T 7.
h
- -Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (199
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
A sLawrence
omN i
o 8.
9. Cass
R. Surigein,
N D Due Process Traiiitionalism, /06 M. R i t t . 1543, 1547 (2008).
a -10. Cass
sA R.
Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STA;\L L. REV. 1899, 1902 ( 2
k
aSunstein
' focuses
Tr I onC1 A L
gjurisprudence
u generally.
C
O
N
Proportionality t h e Supreme Court jUriSPrUd4MCC of Remedies, u s t iC
c11.
e Tracy A_ Thomas,
T
eOHASTINGS
s
U
.
73,
125
(2007).
' C c d 8i n o 0
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h
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B. A Realm of Too Much Minimalism: Reluctant Judicial Factfinding
Whatever the merits of minimalism in constitutional adjudication,
this Essay argues that in another aspect of federal adjudication—what
this Essay terms "reluctant judicial factfinding"—we already have too
much minimalism. I n certain areas of law, courts are quite reluctant to
engage in close scrutiny of critically important facts, instead falling back
on policies that avoid such factfinding, including:
a) r ely ing upon formalities over substance, such as when affirmative defenses turn on the quality o f defendants' compliance
efforts, and courts approve such efforts based on their formal
characteristics, without any closer look at their substance (see
Part II below);
b) deferring to the parties whose actions are at issue, as in cases
challenging actions by defendants that are certain kinds o f
complex institutions, such as prisons or schools (see Part III
below); and
c) av oiding issuing rulings the litigation rules contemplate, such
as the awards of attomey's fees mandated by Federal Rule 37
for prevailing parties on discovery motions (see Part IV below).
Parts II, III, and IV discuss each of these three areas of reluctant
judicial factfinding. Then, Part V offers some thoughts as to possible
causes of this reluctance to undertake factual inquiries that statutes, rules,
and Supreme Court precedent instruct district and appellate courts to
undertake. One possibility is that hostility to litigation motivates courts
to shy away from detailed factfinding that certain cases require. Suc h
hostility likely is part of the story—at least as to some courts that exhibit
an unusual degree o f hostility to certain kinds o f cases. B u t more
fundamentally, even a judge not at all hostile to litigation may shy away
from the sort of detailed factual look at a party that would require the
judge to second-guess attorney motivations in discovery, to second-guess
judgment calls by complex institutions such as prisons or universities,
or to second-guess the details of a workplace anti-bias program. Suc h
reluctance may derive fr om a n otherwise commendable judic ial
modesty—yet in the three areas this Essay discusses, judicial secondguessing of litigants is mandated by law, and refusal to second-guess just
yields poor factual findings. I n short, judges should not shy away from
aggressive factfinding roles where their authority and need to do so is
clear, even i f it stretches judges past understandable limits o f their
comfort zone.
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AVOIDING FACTF1NDING BY RELYING UPON FORMALITY OVER
SUBSTANCE: INSUFFICIENT SCRUTINYOF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION
PROGRAMS
In employment discrimination and harassment cases, two key
defenses for employers turn on the quality of their anti-discrimination
and anti-harassment programs. Unfortunately, the case law on these
defenses shows little judicial appetite for the sort of fact-laden, subjective inquiries these defenses require of judges.
First, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton
Inc., v12
. Eller
a n th"
d announced that even where an employee proves
unlawful
workplace
by a supervisor, the employer is not
B u r l i n gharassment
t o n
vicariously
liable
if
it
establishes
a
affirmative defense: "(a) that
I n d u s t r i e two-part
s ,
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly
any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage o f any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise" (the
Faragher/Ellerth defense).
14 Second, an employment discrimination plaintiff can recover punitive damages against an employer only when the employer acted "with
malice o r w it h reckless indifference" t o t h e employee's antidiscrimination rights.
15 I n Court interpreted that statutory requirement as disallowing
Supreme
punitive
K o l sdamages
t a d when the employer can establish an affirmative
defense:
v
. that whatever individuals in the workplace committed the
discrimination,
A m e r they
i did so contrary to the employer's good faith efforts
to
comply
with
the
discrimination laws (the Kolstad defense)."
c a n
D Employer
e
n programs ar e k ey t o both t h e Faragher/Ellerth
defense and the Kolstad defense. The Faragher/Ellerth inquiry into the
t
a
l
employer's efforts "to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassA s s o c
ing behavior"
i a t i o
undertaken
I8 a n d g o o d faith efforts at Title VII compliance"
n substantially
,
but
19
s t i n"inc practice."
t
t h a er e d i overlap
IN 6
K o l s
t 12. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
t a13.d524 U.S. 742 (1998).
h
i n14_ Faragher,
q
524 U.S. at 807.
e 15.42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (2000).
u i r
16. 527 U.S. 526 (1999).
y 17. M at 544.
i
18.n
Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807.
Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544.
t 19. o
20. Bettina B. Plevan, Training and Other Techniques to Address Complaints of Harassment,
w PRACh LAW IN ST ./LI
682
should
not
-e
t necessarily defeat the ability to prove a Kolstad defense. I n practice, however, that is not
always
the
case ...." ) .
F
IG.
6
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Both Faragher/Ellerth and Kolstad expressly demand that the
employer bear a burden of proving not just the existence but the substantive sufficiency of their anti-bias programs—yet the case law features
little judicial inquiry into substance. Under Kolstad, the employer must
prove that it undertook "good faith c o m p l i a n c e " efforts;
Faragher/Ellerth,
21 u n d e r the employer must prove it "exercised reasonable
care" in its efforts to prevent and correct workplace harassment.
many
however, the mere fact that an employer has the fairly
22 Tcourts,
o
standard workplace anti-bias policy—any employee training, a grievance
policy, and an official anti-discrimination/harassment policy—suffices,
without any inquiry into the substance o f the complaint process or
training, to establish both the Kolstad defense" and the Faragher/Ellerth
defense.
regardless
24
of their actual effectiveness," Susan Sturm has noted.
25
S u This
c approach many courts are taking is one of facial adequacy—an
employer
merely has to check the boxes o f the standard anti-bias
h
program—that
reflects a judicial reluctance to undertake the sort of scruc o
tiny
u r oft anti-bias programs that the Supreme Court has made an important
s
" 21.
h Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 544 (emphasis added).
22. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807 (emphasis added).
a 23. See, a g , Bryant v. Aiken Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 333 F.3d 536, 548-49 (4th Cir. 2003)
(Kolstad
v
satisfied by employer's "organization-wide Equal Employment Opportunity Policy" that
contained
(1) a ban on discrimination, (2) a grievance policy encouraging employees to report d
e
iscrimination or harassment, (3) a diversity training program with classes and group exercises, and
d tracking of employee demographics by department); Cooke v. Stefani Mgmt Servs., Inc., 250
(4)
F.3d
e 564,
f 568--69 (7th Cir. 2001) (defense satisfied by employer program that contained (1) a sexual
harassment policy, (2) a sexual harassment seminar for managers, and (3) an anti-harassment poster
e r
mounted in the workplace). B u t see Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 810-11 (9th Cir.
r e
2001)
(explaining when purported anti-discrimination p r o p
of even relatively low-level supervisors may be imputed to the employer i f the supervisors
-inaction
d
are
a m m iade
s responsible,
i n s u f fi pur
c i suant
e n t t o com pany pol i c y , f o r r eceiving a n d ac ti ng o n
t
complaints
of
harassment.
[
I
l t is insufficient for an employer simply to have i n place antiu n d e r
harassment
o o l policies;
K
s t it must
a dalso:implement them.").
24. "[D]istribution of a valid antiharassment policy provides compelling proof that [an em"a
[
T
]
h
e
ployer] exercised reasonable care in preventing and promptly correcting sexual harassment," varin circuits have held. Adams v. O'Reilly Auto., Inc., 538 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation
ous
omitted);
see also White v. BEI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 299 (4th Cir. 2004) ("distribution
e
by an employer o f an anti-harassment policy provides 'compelling pr oof that the [employer]
m
exercised
reasonable care in preventing and promptly correcting harassment") (citation omitted);
Walton
v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that disp
seminating an anti-harassment policy is "fundamental to meeting the requirement for exercising
l
reasonable care in preventing sexual harassment"); Caridad v. Metro-North Commuter RR., 191
o
F.3d 283, 295 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that "an anti-harassment policy with complaint procedures is
an
y important consideration in determining whether [an] employer has satisfied" its Faragher/Ellerth
duty); Brown v. Perry, 184 F.3d 388, 395 (4th Cir. 1999); Shaw v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 806,
e
811 (7th Cir. 1999).
r 25. Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101
COLum.
L. REV. 458, 537 (2001).
'
s
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
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part of many discrimination and harassment cases. That many courts are
relying only on formalities rather than substance is unfortunate, given the
extensive criticism of many employer programs as pro forma, ineffectual, or worse. " Ma n y o f the internal dispute resolution mechanisms
developed by employers c o n s i s t of boilerplate from the most recent
decisions o f the Court or the reproduction o f EEOC guidelines,"
making such programs "symbolic rather than substantive."
26
limited
presents a "risk that employers w ill adopt
27 W judic
o r ial
s escrutiny
,
legalistic, sham, or symbolic internal processes that leave underlying
patterns of bias unchanged."
28 Given the very real difference between good and bad workplace
anti-bias programs,
distinguish
29 t o tamong
h e such programs, they are allowing employers to escape
discrimination
with affirmative defenses they do not deserve.
e x t e n liability
t
By
avoiding
factfinding
as to the substance of anti-bias programs, courts
t
h
a
t
do
not
really
avoid
factual
findings; they just ensure that they will too
c
o
u
r
often
t
sfind such programs effective, regardless of their substance or actual
effectiveness.
a
r
e AVOIDING FACTFINDING BY DEFERRING TO DEFENDANTS IN CASES
n
o
AGAINST
PUBLIC SCHOOLS,PRISONS, AND UNIVERSITIES
t
In certain areas of law, courts grant defendants a striking degree of
e
n
d
deference in assessing the reasonableness o f conduct challenged as
eunlawful.
a
Tv h e main areas of such deference this Essay will note are
oemployment
r
i claims
n
against colleges or universities, prisoners' claims of
gconstitutional rights violations, and public school students' free speech
tclaims.
o

26. M at 543.
27. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in Employment
Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. Si. U. L. REV. 959, 963 (1999). Bisom-Rapp further notes
"how defense lawyers attempt to strategically position employers to safeguard these clients against
discrimination and other employment-related litigation," id. at 961, and presents a "content analysis
of the defense literature advocating preventative practices" showing that employment defense attorneys often "creat[e] the appearance of nondiscriminatory decision making without an equivalent
emphasis on facilitating substantive change for protected groups." Id. at 965-66.
28. Sturm, supra note 25, at 490 ("Some courts have deferred to. an employer's procedures,
regardless of their actual effectiveness in eliminating [discrimination] [ T h i s ] uncritical acceptance of internal dispute resolution processes legitimates purely formalistic solutions," id. at 537—
38).
29. For further criticism of courts' failure to distinguish among workplace anti-bias programs,
see Scott A. Moss & Peter H. Huang, Replacing Too-Narrow "Rationality" Premises in Employment
Law: How Behavioral & Happiness Research Actually Can Be Useful (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
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• I n employment claims against colleges or universities, courts
apply a "deferential standard" in scrutinizing the challenged
employer d e c i s i o n
tenured
status,
30
Deference
31
- - - eb supteexplains
c i a l l y "the relative ease with which the courts of
have
found the employer's burden to be satisfied in the
iappeals
n
a
s
academic
context";
ot t oh e
about one quarter of the time."
33
In] i cases
rin
d civil
e" [ rights
a only
l
34
a
c
u
l
t
y
es m p l
op ly a mi f ne t i
nf f t rs o Coll.,
m39 F.3d 21,26 (1st Cir. 1994) ("[C]ourt review of tenure deci30. Binapv. Providence
p
r
e
v
d
e
c
sions should be
o guided
t by ian appropriately
o n deferential standard. ' A court may not simply substitute
its own viewsia
si lithe plaintiff's qualifications for those of the properly instituted authorities;
t concerning
the evidence must be of such strength and quality as to permit a reasonable finding that the denial of
o nor manifestly
s
tenure was obviously
unsupported." (quoting Brown v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 891
n
F.2d 337, 346a(1st Cir. 1989)); accord Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 376 (4th Cir.
1995) ("[W]hile
is available to aggrieved professors, we review professorial employment
st Title VII h
decisions with great trepidation."); Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974)
e discrimination
w
e
(holding, in gender
case under Title VII, that " [o]f all fields t h e federal courts
should hesitate
lmto invade
1 eand take over, education and faculty appointments at a University level are
probably the least
suited
i for federal
t court supervision").
.r v. S. Routt
31. Carlile
Sch. Dist. RE-3J, 739 F.2d 1496, 1500-01 (10th Cir. 1984) ("[C]ourts
s review2the merits of tenure decisions," and defendants in such cases "are given wide
are reluctant 3
to
latitude in discretion concerning whom to award tenure.").
32. See. e.g., Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of
summary judgment to defendant on professor's sex discrimination claim in denial of bonuses; "As
nonobjective as the selection criteria m a y have been, this circuit and others have been reluctant
to review the merits of tenure decisions and other academic honors in the absence of clear discrimination. W e have previously recognized that scholars are in the best position to make the highly
subjective judgments related with the review of scholarship and university service."); Bina, 39 F.3d
21 ("The district court appropriately applied this [deferential] standard to the present case, even
though this is a case not of denial of tenure but of denial of appointment to a tenure track position.");
Dorsett v. Bd. of Trustees for State Coils. & Univs., 940 F.2d 121, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1991) (noting in
harassment claim: "In public schools and universities across this nation, interfaculty disputes arise
daily over teaching assignments, room assignments, administrative duties, classroom equipment,
teacher recognition, and a host of other relatively trivial matters. A federal court is simply not the
appropriate forum in which to seek redress for such harms. W e have neither the competency nor the
resources to undertake to micromanage the administration of thousands of state educational institutions.") (citations omitted); Smith v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 345 n.26 (4th Cir. 1980)
("University employment cases have always created a decisional dilemma for the courts. Unsure
how to evaluate the requirements for appointment, reappointment and tenure, and reluctant to
interfere with the subjective and scholarly judgments which are involved, the courts have refused to
impose their judgment as to whether the aggrieved academician should have been awarded the
desired appointment or promotion... ' W e, therefore, refuse to embark upon a comparative inquiry
into either the quantity or the quality of the published scholarly contributions of the University's
faculty members who have been granted or denied promotion.") (citations omitted).
33. Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 656 R2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (reversing defense
judgment in gender discrimination case but noting the deference courts grant academic defendants).
34. Barbara A. Lee, Employment Discrimination in Higher Education, 26 J.C. & U.L. 291, 292
(1999). Compare the success rates of 41 to 57 percent (depending on type of claim) for all employment discrimination plaintiffs (i.e., not just academic plaintiffs). I d at 292 n.5.
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• I n prisoner constitutional rights claims, courts expressly apply a
lower, more deferential standard of scrutiny than in non-prison
claims of the same rights. Governmental restrictions on most
speech must be "necessary" to "compelling" or "significant"
interests, but restrictions on prisoners' speech need only be
"reasonably related" to "legitimate" interests;
"[m]ost
35 a sregulations
a
ro f eprisoner
s u lspeech
t , have been upheld,"
including significant limits on prisoners' rights to send mai1,
36
order books,
37
graphs.
38 o r
39
p o s s e
s
• I ns public
student speech claims, the Supreme Court allows
a
n
content-based
restrictions, such as censoring newspaper articles
yon pregnancy and divorce and punishing a high school student
n a
e speech
w
for
with mild sexual content.
s4 p apunishing a student for a banner that read, "BONG
allowed
HITS
4rJESUS";
'p Te h
e
C o u r t
"reasonably
42
sr e, c e viewed
n t [it]
l as
y promoting illegal drug[s]."
ring
to
an
official's
interpretation
of cryptic speech "departs
43
D
e
f
e
r
tmh oau g h
markedly
from
the
Court's
general
First Amendment rule"
tg ha e
allowing
only of incitement that is intentional and
b
n
z ai npunishment
likely
to
succeed
imminently.
44These decisions "cast doubt on
e
n re
whether students retain free speech rights. There simply
w
s
, a
are hardly any Supreme Court cases in the past thirty years
so
protecting students' constitutional rights."
"r c r y
45
p t i c
,h "
35. See, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 528 (2006); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87
to
(1987).
36. ERWIN
h
t CHEMERINSKY,CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLESAND POLICIES § 11.4.4, at 1147
(3d ed. 2006)e
o(collecting cases).
37. Turner, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (upholding rule against prisoners mailing letters to prisoners
c
elsewhere). s
38. Bellhv. Wolfish,
o 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (upholding rule against prisoners receiving hardcover
books other than from publishers or bookstores).
o
l
39. Beard, 548 U.S. 521 (upholding rule disallowing newspapers, magazines, or photographs
to prisoners housed in unit for those who committed misconduct while incarcerated).
40. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
41. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
42. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007).
43. Id. at 2624-25.
44. Scott A. Moss, Students and Workers and Prisoners—Oh, My! A Cautionary Note About
Excessive Institutional Tailoring o f First Amendment Doctrine, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1635, 1642
(2007).
45. Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the Schoolhouse
Gates: What's Left offinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 529 (2000).
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These doctrines are cast as "deference" doctrines, but given the
range o f other areas where courts decline to delve deeply into critical
facts, they fit into a broader pattern: the way in which courts "defer" is
not just by applying a different legal standard (as in prisoner claims), but
by expressing a reluctance to undertake detailed factfinding under the
same legal standards (as in student and academic employee claims).
Similar critiques apply to each o f these three areas in which courts defer
to defendants on questions fundamental to liability (as we ll as to other
areas in which courts defer simila rly).
4 6 A deference—that
academic
c r i t i c i s it
m is premised on an exaggerated sense that
I
certain
fieldshare too
a complex
v
e fo r judges to analyze—equally applies to
l
any
deference
e
v
ibased
e ond the complexity o r subjectiveness o f particular
fields:
a
g
a
i
n
s
t
[A]cademia is far from the only field in which evaluation o f performance is discretionary and entails highly specialized knowledge;
the same is true of various other fields in which federal courts, from
the district level to the Supreme Court, have allowed discrimination
claims to prevail or survive dispositive motions, such as: accounting
partnerships; administrative l a w judgeships; l a w enforcement;
engineering; computer programming; and hard sciences such as
chemistry.
With these areas o f deference being similar, and subject to similar
critiques, the widely varied criticisms o f academic deference thus apply
to each o f these areas. B y "mak[ing] it too difficult f o r a plaintiff to
survive a motion for summary judgment," deference "frustrates the intent
of Title V I I by insulating universities fro m judicial scru tin y"
48 a n d
h a s
46. Two other areas where courts grant deference to defendants on fundamental liability questions are students' challenges to academic discipline and public employees' First Amendment
claims. See Curtis J. Berger & Vivian Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the
University Student, 99 Comm. L. REV. 289, 334 (1999) (arguing that deferential "arbitrary and
capricious" review of college students' dismissals for academic failure "seems appropriate where the
agency's or school's decision calls for an expert judgment," but that "where a student's career may
be at stake because of an academic 'crime,' akin to fraud or copyright infringement, matters courts
handle as fact-finders routinely, colleges should not enjoy quite the same def er enc e" ) ; Eugene
Volokh, A Common-Law Model for Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465, 1497 (1999)
("Administrative efficiency is generally not considered a compelling interest under strict scrutiny,
which may be one reason that free speech cases have explicitly adopted a more deferential standard
for government-as-employer regulations, instead of purporting to apply strict scrutiny.").
47. Scott A. Moss, Against "Academic Deference": How Recent Developments in Employment
Discrimination Law Undercut an Already Dubious Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 6—
7 (2006) (collecting cases).
48. Courtney T. Nguyen, Employment Discrimination and the Evidentiary Standard for Establishing Pretext: Weinstock v. Columbia University, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1305, 1308-09 (2002)
(criticizing Weinstock, 224 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), which affirmed a grant of summary judgment to a
university on a professor's sex discrimination claim).
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been "criticized as a form of judicial abdication:"
said
49 to hf the
e need
s aform lawsuits
e
cto vindicate
o u l First
d Amendment rights.
Preventing
discrimination
suits
against
universities
may be especially
b
e
troubling because of two juxtaposed facts: gender segregation is highly
persistent in many parts o f academia
restrictions
5c1 ( j u sare
t common
a s in pris ons
in
explaining
the
permissibility
o f affirmative action in law school
51
q u i t e
admission,
);
h t e i c can be "essential t o [the] educational
d ar na d that
m t a"diversity"
mission"
of
higher
(and
ec
sS u p p re e emeducation
h free speech is no less essential).
Finally,
as
Professor
Elizabeth
Bartholet noted, academic deference
52
C
o
u
r
t
seems
not
but contrary to legislative intent, because it
h
a only undesirable,
s
is
"inconsistent
with
the
[
T
i t l e VII amendments] that specifically
n
o
t
e
d
removed the exemption for academic institutions."
,
point
53 Aabouts constitutional
i m i l a r rights—that they protect everyone, without
exclusion
o f those
settings—equally undercuts the idea o f
t h e m
a t ini certain
c
watered-down speech rights for students or prisoners. Whereas older
case law declared a convicted prisoner to have "not only forfeited his
liberty, but all his personal rights," making him "the slave of the State,"
the modern rule is to the contrary:
54
Prison wa lls d o n o t fo rm a barrier separating prison inmates
from the protections o f the Constitution. [ P ] r i s o n e r s retain the

constitutional right to petition the government for the redress of
grievances; they are protected against invidious racial discrimination by the Equal Protection Clause a n d they enjoy the
protections of due process.
55

Formally, at least, the same rule applies to public school students—they
do not "shed their constitutional rights t o freedom o f speech o r
expression at the schoolhouse gate."
56
49. Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945,
961 (1982) (noting and criticizing that in academic cases, "courts have adopted a 'hands-off' doctrine").
50. See Moss, supra note 47, at 14-15 (noting evidence of the persistence of occupational
segregation i n legal academia and elsewhere); see generally Christine kills, Accommodation
Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 293 tb1.3 (2000) (noting a wide range of occupations that were
more than 95% male (e.g., a wide range of blue-collar/mechanical jobs, including supervisory positions, transportation jobs such as airplane pilots and ship captains, and firefighting) and several that
were more than 95% female, such as prekindergarten and kindergarten teachers, childcare workers,
secretaries and receptionists, and dental hygienists and dental assistants).
51. See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
52. Gmtter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328 (2003).
53. Bartholet, supra note 49, at 961.
54. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 1871 W L 4928, at *4 (1871).
55. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (collecting cases) (citations omitted).
56. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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Of course, the basic thrust of this Section is that these odes to the
rights of prisoners and students are illusory platitudes to equal rights;
courts' actual rulings do not grant students, prisoners, or academic
employees equal rights to nondiscriminatory treatment, freedom o f
speech, or other liberties—and the lack of such equality of rights does
not hold up when analyzed critically.
I V. AVOIDING FACTFINDING BY AVOIDING CERTAIN KINDS OF RULINGS:
THE CURIOUS ABSENCE OF RULE-AUTHORIZED DISCOVERY SANCTIONS

When a party prevails on a motion to compel discovery by its
opponent, or a motion for a protective order against discovery the other
side has demanded, that prevailing party is entitled by Federal Rule 37 to
recover fr om the opponent the attomey's fees and out-of-pocket
expenses that the motion cost: " I f the motion is granted t h e court
must.
. pay to the movant's reasonable expenses incurred in making the
to
motion,
including attorney' s fees."
r e
57
q u This fee and cost shifting is mandatory with delineated exceptions:
the
party will not recover fees and costs if (a) it violated a rule
i r prevailing
e
in
bringing
the
motion (most notably, if it had not undertaken the Rule
t
37-required
"good
faith" efforts to resolve the matter before making the
h
motion), (b) the losing party had taken a "substantially justified" position
e
that nevertheless lost, or (c) "other circumstances make an award o f
p
expenses unjust."
a
ity ofI tan exception
to the rule mandating fee and cost shifting.
58
i s
rtextual
of substantial justification for a losing position—the
h e
t59h Terequirement
t
main
exception
to
mandatory
fee shifting—is not, by the text of the rule
l o s i n
y some case law, easy to establish; plausible examples might be a
and
g
w
close
p alegalr call or an inability to make the requested production." The
exception
h
allowing a court not to shift fees also has been interpreted as
t y
applying
where the injury was limited, such as when the discovery
o
w
h
failure
had been remedied by the time of the motion.
s
o
6I
e
m 57. FED.
u R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (emphasis added). R ul e 37(a) concerns motions to compel;
c
s
motion
for tprotective orders are governed by Rule 26(c), which makes the Rule 37 fee-shifting
o
provision
applicable
to protective order motions. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(3).
p
r
n 58. FED. R. Clv. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)—(iii).
o 59. See,
v e.g., Neufeld v. Neufeld, 169 F.R.D. 289, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("As the text of the
d makes clear,
rule
the party who has failed to [provide discovery] b e a r s the burden of demonstrate
ing
u a substantial justification.").
t 60. See, e.g., Cullins v. Heckler, 108 F.R.D. 172, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that defendants
c
h
proved
"substantial justification" in not providing statistics they had not been keeping before litigat
tion).
e
n 61. See, e.g., Coon v. Froehlich, 573 F. Supp. 918 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (declining to award fees
a deposition
p
pbegan late but already had occurred by time of motion).
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e
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s
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a
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e

560 S e a t t l e University Law Review [ V o l . 32:549
There are numerous cases in which courts have awarded fees and
costs to parties who prevail on discovery motions,
62 ahailed
have
n d thectrend
o min m
recent
e nyears
t a toward
t o r more
s
judicial willingness to
award attorneys' fees and other monetary sanctions o n discovery
motions:
For many years, lawyers and some judges complained loudly that
the courts were unwilling to impose any [discovery] sanctions
A rapidly growing body of decisions dealing with Rule 37 sanctions
signals an end to this broad reluctance and imposing monetary
sanctions, usually in the form of attorneys' fees and costs to parties
victimized by abusive behavior, is now common.
63
Yet fee awards or other monetary sanctions are nowhere near as
"common" as might be indicated by (a) the plain text of Rule 37 declaring them mandatory absent a specific showing by the losing party, or (b)
the case law documenting those instances in which courts do award
attorneys' fees or other sanctions. Georgene Vairo has noted how the
1970 amendment creating mandatory fee shifting "failed to turn Rule 37
into an effective tool" because "most judges continued to ignore the
presumption contained in Rule 37(a)(4) and did not award expenses to
the moving party with any regularity."
found
only after he or she first
64 Fthat
o judges
r
e usually
x a mimposed
p l esanctions
,
ordered
" [ discovery,
o ] n gave
e a party a second chance to comply, and the failure
s to tcomply
u was
d willful
y or not e x p l a i n e d "
author's
experience
in
his
six years of district court litigation work.
65
sharplywlimiting
motions are a key
— w hLocal
i c h c ivail rules
l s o
a discovery
s
reason
for
the
lack
of
Rule
37
fee
awards
in
two
of
the largest federal
t
h
i
s
judicial districts—the United States District Courts for the Southern
District of New York and the Eastern District of New York, which, in
covering New York City and its most populous suburbs, encompass over
ten million people and a disproportionate amount of the nation's financial and other business. Bo t h districts have promulgated among their
62. See, e.g., United States v. Aldeco, 917 F.2d 689 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that fee award was
justified by party's failure to answer interrogatories timely); Neufeld, 169 F.R.D. 289 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (awarding fees for failure to allow deposition, and noting, as to losing party's argument that its
position was justified or understandable, that even though the losing party had filed a motion to
relieve its counsel a day before the deposition, no motion to delay the deposition was filed, and
dismissal of counsel was not yet ordered); EEOC v. Kleckner H & K Mach., Inc., 168 F.R.D. 233
(ED. Wis. 1996) (awarding fees and costs against defendant that had withheld evidence of its
finances on the unsupported premise that the capping of punitive damages eliminated its duty to
produce financial records the law established as relevant to the amount of punitive damages).
63. Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposals to Amend the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 189, 217-18 (1992).
64. Georgene Vaim, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67 FORDHAM L. Rev. 589, 595 (1998).
65. M
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local c iv il rules requirements that parties let district judges resolve
discovery disputes, by order i f necessary, before any actual Rule 37
motion can be filed, as discussed below. Federal Rule 37(a)(1) requires
that a party filing a motion to compel have "in good faith conferred or
attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make disclosure or
discovery in an effort to obtain it without court action"—and these two
districts' local rules supplement this rule with another, more significant
pre-motion requirement.
• S_D.N.Y. Local Civil Rule 37.2 bars motions to compel or for
protective orders until the parties present the dispute to the
Court for a possible ruling that, because no formal motion has
been made yet, may not include the fee award Rule 37
mandates for actual discovery motions: " N o motion under
Rules 26 through 37 s h a l l be heard unless t h e moving
party has first requested an informal conference with the court
and such request has either been denied or the discovery dispute
has not been resolved as a consequence of such a conference."
• E.D .N .Y. Local Civ il Rule 37.3 is , i f anything, stricter in
pre-empting discovery motions: i t requires that parties i n
discovery disputes "shall notify the court" by phone or (more
commonly) each submitting a "letter not exceeding three pages
in length outlining the nature of the dispute and attaching relevant materials" (R.37.3(c)), and then specifically anticipates a
"Decision o f the Court" upon those letter submissions
(R.37.3(e)).
Due to these rules, S.D.N.Y. and EDNA'. cases commonly feature
hotly-contested discovery disputes that the parties press to the judge, and
that yield judicial rulings in favor of one side or the other—but that
generate no fee awards whatsoever because, technically, the court
resolved the disputes before the filing of any Rule 37 motion that could
have provided fees to the prevailing party. For example:
• I n one case, a Rule 37 motion to exclude testimony disclosed
after a deadline was denied upon the parties' letter submissions
pursuant to S.D.N.Y. Loc al Civil Rule 37.2 and a telephone
conference with the Magistrate Judge—with neither a fee award
to the prevailing party nor discussing or finding whether the
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losing party was substantially justified or otherwise established
an exception to the fee requirement.
66
• I n another case, at the initial case management conference
required by Federal Rule 16, the court resolved a dispute about
whether an employment discrimination plaintiff could obtain
discovery of numerous personnel files of those who received
the Store Manager positions the plaintiff was denied; the
court's decision allowing discovery of most of the personnel
files lacked a fee award and did not even appear on the case
docket, which reflected only the order scheduling that case
management conference.
°
• Y e t another case shows how, perhaps because S.D.N.Y. and
E.D.N.Y. local rules make fees on discovery motions unusual,
even judges making on-the-record orders on discovery disputes
sometimes just deny prevailing parties fees, without discussing
or finding whether the losing party was substantially justified or
otherwise established an exception to the fee requirement.
68
Thus, while local civil rules cannot formally repeal a federal rule of civil
procedure, the S.D_Isl.Y. and E.D.N.Y. Local Civil Rules have effectively
repealed the Rule 37 mandatory fee-shifting provision by preventing
most Rule 37 motions from ever getting filed.
Professor Vairo's analysis of why courts do not award fees or other
sanctions more often on discovery motions is, essentially, a description
of the phenomenon and causes of exactly the sort of reluctant judicial
factfinding this Essay diagnoses as prevalent among the federal courts:
Judges cited several reasons fo r declining to impose sanctions: a
distaste for becoming involved in discovery disputes that litigants
should be able to resolve themselves; a feeling that litigants should
seek sanctions against an adversary only when they have been with66. Margolin v. Food Emporium, No. 99-cv-02961 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr il 23, 1999) (Civil
Docket, entries dated December 3, 1999, and December 9, 1999) (letter pursuant to Local Civil Rule
37.2 and record of telephone conference with Magistrate Judge decision, respectively, in the latter of
which the Court made its order, which is not recorded on the civil docket).
67. Wright v. Sports Authority, No. 01-cv-02326 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 20, 2001) (Civil
Docket, entry #7).
68. See, e.g., Ansoumana v. Gristedes Operating Corp., No. 00-cv-00253 (S.D.N.Y. filed
January 13, 2000) (Civil Docket, entry #62) (summary order granting plaintiffs their requested
protective order with no fee award, but also with no finding as to whether defendants established any
of the exceptions to the rule requiring fee awards for prevailing parties on discovery disputes).
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out fault in complying with discovery; and a feeling that the imposition of a sanction embarrasses or humiliates the attorney or party
and should thus be resorted to only in extreme situations.
6
It is in many ways commendable that judges avoid costly formal motion
'
practice
by resolving discovery disputes after only limited briefing or
informal oral argument at in-court scheduling conferences. Av oiding
required fee shifting might lessen the burden of two inquiries that are
difficult for judges to make: discerning when a fees-at-stake discovery
motion has been brought for purely tactical reasons; and discerning the
reasonableness of attorneys' fees (an inquiry that courts do undertake but
that is quite time- and fact-intensive). Av oiding required fee shifting
may have defensible motivations, but it means that the fee-shifting
provision of Rule 37 is not in effect under the apparent terms of its plain
text: fee shifting on discovery disputes is too often the exception rather
than a rule-imposed mandate with narrow exceptions.
V. WHY COURTS AVOID FACTFINDING: A MIX OFTROUBLING
HOSTILITY TO LITIGATION AND ADMIRABLE JUDICIAL MODESTY

District and appellate courts' reluctance to undertake deeper factual
inquiries may have different causes. The district and appellate courts are
not a monolithic bloc, but hundreds of different courts and judges. Most
likely, different judges have different reasons for their factfinding
reluctance, and some judges of course are not reluctant factfinders at all.
Most judges' factfinding reluctance stems from one (or both) of two very
different explanations: hostility to litigation and/or judicial modesty.
A. Hos tility to Litigation—Especially in Employment Discrimination
Most of the forms of reluctant judicial factfinding discussed in this
Essay may reflect a broad-based hostility to litigation, because they make
it harder for plaintiffs to prevail. Specifically, out of hostility to litigation, some courts are eager to make whatever "findings" support an
affirmative defense—such as the effectiveness of an anti-discrimination
program—that might let it dismiss a case. I am not that quick to ascribe
outcome-oriented motives to judges; it is too easy, and therefore sometimes a substitute for more careful analysis. B u t Andrew Siegel has
persuasively shown that hostility to litigation is the most unifying theme
of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence since the Rehnquist Court era,
explaining mor e o f the Court's jurisprudence than originalism,
federalism, or political conservatism (e.g., it leads the Court to make
inconsistent rulings in violation of theories that often hold sway with
69. Vain), supra note 64, at 595.
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certain Justices, such as federalism and originalism)." With hostility to
litigation such a prominent force at the Supreme Court, it is not much of
a stretch to suggest that it might play a role in at least some of the federal
judiciary's rulings.
District and appellate judge hostility to litigation seems especially
plausible i n employment discrimination cases. Some judges have
expressed outright hostility to employment discrimination cases by
mocking plaintiffs' claims o f discrimination, in fairly unprofessional
terms, in decisions dismissing such claims.
judicial
hostility to entire remedial
71 O decisions
t h e r gratuitously
j u d g expressing
e s
statutes
providing
federal
causes
of
action.
h
a
v
e
the
72
Fr u rihas
t htissued
e tr , aeseries
in of
n "9-0 decisions reversing too-restrictive
w Court
circuit
o n the
j u holdings
s t
t fundamental
h
i
s o f what constitutes sufficient
d e c
a d e ,
70. Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing
Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006). Others, though, see
apparent inconsistencies i n the Court's jurisprudence as reflecting not hostility to litigation but
"competing conservative principles in play," such as "respect for state authority versus respect for
the unalienability of human life." Kmiec, supra note 3, at 507 (discussing the "competing conservative principles" appearing in cases about federal power to restrict liberal state medical policy such as
the legalization of assisted suicide in Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (Kmiec might have
added Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), in which the federal government sought to overturn
California's law allowing medicinal use of marijuana)). The response in support of Siegel's thesis is
that while the Court does regularly face tension among "conservative principles," especially in cases
about a state's right to enact a policy more liberal than the federal government would like to allow,
the Court's choice among conservative policies seems consistent with a pattern o f choosing
whichever "conservative principle" results in less litigation.
71. See, e.g., Fishery. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332, 1351 n.7 (2d Cir. 1997) (Jacobs, J., concurring) (using a literary reference to mock the concept of discrimination based on an intersection of
two or more classes—specifically, plaintiff's claim, and the lower court's finding, of discrimination
on the basis of Dr. Fisher's status as a married woman: " H ow fascinating is that class / Whose only
member is Me!' W.H. Auden, 'Islands,' 24, The Shield of Achilles (1955)."); Rosa v. Brink's Inc.,
103 F. Supp. 2d 287, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (Rakoff, J.) (in mocking the idea that a bigoted individual
could be biased against a number of groups, beginning a judicial opinion dismissing an employment
discrimination claim as follows: "Move over, Archie Bunker. Accor di ng to the plaintiff here,
defendant Brink's Inc. and three of its executives are so steeped in prejudice that they intentionally
discriminated against her on grounds o f race, national origin, gender, age, and disability—all at
once.").
72. See, e.g., Phillip v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 945 F.2d 1054, 1055 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming
denial of recusal made after District Judge Dean Whipple said, in ruling on an evidentiary dispute:
"' I am not going to let them in, unproven allegations. Just because lawsuits are filed doesn't give
credibility to them, especially in these cases. Those are Title VII cases. Congress has created a
nightmare because they entice anybody and everybody to file those things and entice any attorney to
file them in the mere chance that i f they win a dollar they can win attorney fees. So I think any Title
VII cases ought to be looked at with suspicion to begin with because it's a crap shoot, which everybody engages in.' "); Phillips v. Pepsi Bottling Group, No. 05-cv-01322-EWN-PAC, 2007 W L
3378544, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 13, 2007) (denying motion for recusal made after, plaintiff claimed, a
Magistrate Judge said: " T he biggest problem w i th your case is that Judge Nottingham hats
employment cases and there's nothing you can do about [it] [ H ] e will try to find anything in the
summary judgment briefs to say there's no material issues and grant summary judgment, and i f he
doesn't, he will make it tough at trial, and you won't win.'").
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evidence of d is c r im in a t io n "
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area of law is further evidence, because for every one judge willing to go
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e
out on sa limb declaring open skepticism or upset about employment
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v
ie 73. Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme
Courts, 76 FoRDHAm L. REV. 981, 1001 (2007).
rr
74. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).
ca 75. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-49 (2000).
76. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 54 (2006).
u
d 77. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 90 (2003).
io 78. Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 546 U.S. 454, 456-57 (2006).
tp 79. Reeves, 530 U.S. 133, not only reversed the Fifth Circuit's view, but also abrogated the
First
st Circuit's (and others') view, that as a matter of law a discrimination plaintiff could not prevail
by proving that the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory motivation was pretextual. See Woods v.
(e
Friction
Materials, Inc., 30 F.3d 255 (1st Cir. 1994).
80. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry, 534 U.S. 506, not only reversed the Sixth Circuit's view, but
a
d
also abrogated the Eighth Circuit's (and others') view of what constituted actionable retaliation by
semployers.
t
See Spears v. Mo. Dep't of Corr. & Human Resources, 210 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000)
w
(holding
that a retaliatory lateral transfer with no loss in pay was not actionable).
h
81. Moss, supra note 73, at 1001.
e
e 82. Labor and employment litigation ( of which discrimination is the most prominent compolnent) constitutes 12 to 14 percent of the federal docket. Ann C. Hodges, Mediation and the Transformation
l
of American Labor Unions, 69 Mo. L. REV. 365, 369 n.27 (2004).
a
s
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n
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cases, there presumably are others who hold the same view but have the
sense of propriety not to declare so in public documents.
B. J udic ial Modesty—Too Much of a Good Thing
A second possible explanation for reluctant judicial factfinding is a
judicial tendency that is , generally speaking, admirable: courts are
reluctant to make highly subjective fact determinations as t o very
devil-in-the-details specific matters outside the judicial expertise—such
as whether a particular employer's facially plausible anti-discrimination
program is truly "effective." J udic ial modesty on balance is a good
thing, given the power federal judges wield over the law and over cases
that can determine individuals' fates.
Yet for judges as for all of us, too much modesty can be a bad
thing; it can prevent accomplishing as much as one otherwise might.
And there are several good reasons judges should not expand otherwise
admirable modesty into reluctance to undertake detailed factfinding on
the premise that some subjects are ill-suited for judicial scrutiny. First,
except in adjudicating cases of judicial misconduct, judges do little other
than evaluate contested facts about which they have no personal
expertise; judges with no criminal law experience handle heavy criminal
dockets, while former prosecutors on the bench adjudicate cases about
discrimination, copyrights, religious freedom, etc .
be
83 thoughtful
J u d g legal
e s analysts
a r and
e diligent factual analysts, not to be
subject-matter
who should
shy away from analyzing subjects
h i r e experts
d
t
o
they do not know in advance of the parties' evidentiary presentations.
Second, courts cannot really avoid making murky determinations,
such as the quality o f employers' anti-discrimination programs. B y
deeming virtually any facially plausible program "effective," courts
make inaccurate determinations that almost a ll such programs are
"effective." Similar ly , when they refuse to award fees to prevailing
parties on discovery disputes, as required by a rule mandating fees unless
the losing party was "substantially justified," courts are effectively
holding all losing parties substantially justified. These refusals to undertake close factual analysis, do not really avoid the need to find facts; they
just yield bad factual findings.
Third, and fi nally , ev en i f passing judgment o n employer
programs or party discovery compliance is an undesirable role for federal
judges, they are roles mandated by multiple sources. Congress has
enacted statutes requiring dispute resolution in a wide range of areas by
83. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting that judges evaluate civil cases in a
variety of complex areas).
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generalist federal judges rather than by specialized courts; the Judicial
Conference enacts civil procedure rules like the one requiring fee shifting
in discovery disputes; and the Supreme Court announces fact-intensive
doctrines lik e defenses requiring evaluation o f employers' antidiscrimination programs.
In sum, for district and appellate judges, closely scrutinizing
discovery compliance, employer programs, and other nuanced factual
scenarios would not be improper judicial intrusion. Rather, it would be
entirely proper judicial compliance with a role thrust upon federal judges
by the complex web of rules and statutes they are entrusted and burdened
with applying.

